Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure with Investment by Choi, Jay Pil & Yi, Sang-Seung
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure with Investment
by
Jay Pil Choi, Columbia University
Sang-Seung Yi, Dartmouth College
November 1996
Discussion Paper Series No. 9697-12
/K «e
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure with Investment
Jay Pil Choi* and Sang-Seung Yi**
This version: November 20,1996
Abstract
One of the most enduring controversies in antitrust concerns the potential foreclosure effects of
vertical integration. In a recent paper, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) construct a model of
vertical integration in which vertical foreclosure emerges as the equilibrium outcome. However, as
is well-known, OSS's result breaks down if the vertically integrated firm cannot make the price
commitment In this paper, we reexamine the foreclosure theory of vertical integration by
extending OSS's model to include upstream market power and investments. Cost-reducing
investments introduce a channel through which the integrated firm can credibly commit itself to a
higher input price at which it is willing to supply the unintegrated downstream firm. We show that
a profitable but anticompetitive (both for consumer welfare and for aggregate efficiency) vertical
integration does arise in equilibrium without triggering counter-merger by the unintegrated firms or
causing hold-out problems between the input suppliers. In contrast to OSS's model, where
vertical integration (even with commitment) is not effective under Cournot downstream
competition, vertical integration in our model can be both effective and anticompetitive even under
Cournot downstream competition.
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1. Introduction
One of the most enduring controversies in antitrust concerns the potential foreclosure
effects of vertical integration. The harsh treatment of vertical mergers by the enforcement
agencies and courts in the 1960s, epitomized by the Brown Shoe case (1962) and the 1968
Merger Guidelines1, was based on a poorly conceived classical vertical foreclosure doctrine. In
the classical theory, the integrated firm withdraws from the input market, thereby allowing the
unintegrated input suppliers to raise prices to unintegrated output producers.
This classical vertical foreclosure theory was heavily criticized by Chicago school
commentators for the lack of firm theoretical foundations (e.g., Bork, 1978). The Chicago
school questioned the rationality of the merged firm's decision to withdraw from the input
market. Furthermore, even if the merged firm does refuse to supply the competing output
producers, the foreclosed output producers can neutralize the negative effects of vertical
integration of competitors by counter-merging with the remaining upstream input suppliers.
Finally, even if counter-merger does not take place, there may be hold-out problems among the
input suppliers in carrying out the initial merger with an output producer. These potential hold-
out problems arise because the initial merger increases the remaining input suppliers' profits by
allowing them to raise prices to the remaining output producers.2 In sum, the Chicago school
argued that vertical integration in itself cannot possibly result in vertical foreclosure.
Over the last two decades, the Chicago school has exerted an enormous influence both on
academic economists and on antitrust practitioners. For example, the 1984 Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines and the 1985 Vertical Restraints Guide take a much more favorable view on
the competitive effects of vertical mergers and restraints than the 1968 Guidelines did.
1
 In the Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US 294 (1962) case, the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated that a combined share of 5 percent by the merging companies was excessive in light of
the increasing concentration in the industry (Carlton and Perloff, 1994, p. 819). Under the 1968
Merger Guidelines, the Justice Department would challenge a vertical merger between a supplier
with at least 10% of sales and a purchaser with at least 6% (Reiffen and Vita, 1995).
2
 See Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) for a detailed discussion of the Chicago school's
criticisms of the classical vertical foreclosure theory.
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The criticisms of the Chicago school has also led to new theoretical attempts to put the
vertical foreclosure doctrine on solid foundations.3 For example, Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(OSS) (1990) construct an ingenious model of vertical integration in which vertical foreclosure
emerges as the equilibrium outcome. OSS show that, if the vertically integrated firm can commit
itself to selling its input to the unintegrated downstream firm at or above a specified price,
vertical integration can raise the combined profits of integrating firms by allowing the
unintegrated upstream firm to charge a higher price to the unintegrated downstream firm. This
profitable vertical integration is anticompetitive, because it forecloses the unintegrated firm and
raises output price.
However, as is well-known, OSS's result breaks down if the vertically integrated firm
cannot make the price commitment (Hart and Tirole, 1990; Reiffen, 1992). The integrated firm
has a strong incentive to renege on its price commitment and undercut the unintegrated upstream
firm's price by a small amount, thus stealing the competing upstream firm's profit without
changing the equilibrium outcome of the downstream market. As a result, the only credible price
the integrated firm can commit to is its marginal cost, rendering vertical integration ineffective.4
3
 A brief review of this new literature follows at the end of this section.
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 In their reply to Reiffen's (1992) comments, OSS (1992) argue that vertical integration changes
the integrated firm's incentives to engage in price-cutting in the input market. They model the
input pricing game as a descending-bid auction in which upstream firms bid to supply the
downstream firms. They show that the integrated firm drops out at a price strictly above the
input cost in the bidding game to supply the unintegrated downstream firm, thereby allowing the
unintegrated upstream firm to raise its price above cost (In contrast, in the absence of vertical
integration, both upstream firms stay in the auction until the price reaches their common cost.)
We find OSS's logic unsatisfactory, because it requires that the unintegrated downstream firm be
restricted in its choice of the precise form of the auction in which it selects its input supplier. In
the absence of vertical integration, the standard auctions (such as the descending-bid auction and
the first-price sealed-bid auction) yield the same outcome (input price equals cost), and thus a
downstream firm is indifferent between them. However, once vertical integration takes place,
the unintegrated downstream firm strictly prefers the first-price sealed-bid auction (with
equilibrium input price equal to cost) to the descending-bid auction (with price above cost).
Hence, the unintegrated downstream firm can negate the competitive effects of vertical
integration simply by switching to the first-price sealed-bid auction. Just as the Chicago school
questions the rationality of the integrated firm's refusal to supply the unintegrated rivals, one can
question the rationality of the unintegrated downstream firm's rationality to stick to the
descending-bid auction in OSS's model. In other words, the integrated firm needs to commit that
it will not participate in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Again, in the absence of the commitment
by the integrated firm, vertical integration is ineffective.
Partly because of this weakness of the OSS's model, some antitrust practitioners still express
doubts that vertical integration can result in vertical foreclosure (Reiffen and Vita, 1995).
In this paper, we reexamine the foreclosure theory of vertical integration by extending
OSS's model in two directions. First, we assume that upstream firms possess market power in a
non-integrated industry structure (i.e., an industry structure in which no firms are integrated).
We model the upstream market power in the following simple way. A downstream firm needs to
make input-specific investments in order to use a particular upstream firm's input. We examine a
situation in which the downstream firms have already made relationship-specific investments.
Because of these relationship-specific investments, a downstream firm needs to incur switching
costs if it wants to use the other upstream firm's input (for example, retooling costs of machines
for using different inputs). Due to the switching cost, upstream firms enjoy some ex-post market
power to raise prices over costs. Thus, in our model, vertical integration eliminates a double
markup of profits on the part of integrating firms. Our assumption enriches OSS's model by
allowing the vertically integrated firm to eliminate socially inefficient double marginalization.
Second, we introduce cost-reducing (or, equivalently, quality-enhancing) investments by
the upstream firms. Upstream investments are assumed to be industry-specific (rather than
relationship-specific) so that they lower the cost of supplying both downstream firms (and not
just the current buyer). Our key idea in this paper is that cost-reducing upstream investments
introduce a channel through which the integrated firm can credibly commit itself to a higher
input price at which it is willing to supply the unintegrated downstream firm. We show that, in
the presence of upstream investments, profitable but anticompetitive vertical integration arises in
equilibrium.
In general, vertical integration has ambiguous effects on investments by the merging
upstream firm. First, the elimination of the double markup increases the output of the merging
downstream firm. Since the direct benefit of cost-reducing investment is proportional to the
output produced, the direct effect of vertical integration is to raise the investment incentives of
the merging firm. If the upstream markup (which equals the switching cost) is small, however,
this positive direct effect is small.
Second, vertical integration has a more subtle strategic effect. Due to the lack of any
commitment power on the part of the merging firms, cost-reducing investments by the merged
firm lower the price at which it is willing to supply the unintegrated downstream firm. As a
result, the equilibrium input price of the unintegrated downstream firm decreases, thereby
reducing the merged firm's output An analogous effect arises for an unintegrated upstream firm
under a non-integrated industry structure, but with one key difference. In an unintegrated
industry structure, an upstream firm's equilibrium profit margin is equal to the supplier switching
cost incurred by a downstream firm. Then, for a small switching cost, the profit margin of an
unintegrated firm in the non-integrated industry structure is smaller than the profit margin of the
integrated firm in a partially-integrated industry structure. Since the loss from the reduction in
output is proportional to the profit margin, vertical integration has a negative strategic effect on
investment incentives of the merging upstream firm.
We show that for a small upstream markup (i.e., supplier switching cost), the negative
strategic effect dominates the positive direct effect so that vertical integration reduces
investments of the integrating upstream firm. Lower investments raise the integrating upstream
firm's production costs. The price at which the integrating upstream firm is willing to supply the
unintegrated downstream firm rises in tandem, thereby enabling the unintegrated upstream firm
to raise its input price to the unintegrated downstream firm: Foreclosure of the unintegrated
downstream firm arises in equilibrium despite the absence of any price commitment power on
the part of the merging firms.
Due to the elimination of the double markup, the effect of vertical integration on
consumers is in general ambiguous. However, for small upstream markups, we show that both
downstream prices rise, making consumers uniformly worse off and reducing overall social
welfare. Hence, a privately profitable but socially anticompetitive vertical integration can indeed
arise in equilibrium.
As is emphasized by the Chicago school (and examined in OSS 's model), a complete
theory of vertical integration should allow for a counter-merger by the unintegrated firms and
also address potential hold-out problems among the upstream firms. We show that counter-
integration by the unintegrated firms does not occur in our model for small double markups,
because it reduces their joint profits. When the counter-merger takes place, the input cost of the
newly-integrated downstream firm is equal to its upstream division's per-unit production cost.
Hence, counter-merger destroys the linkage between the already-integrated upstream firm's
investments and the newly-integrated downstream firm's input costs. As a result, the already-
integrated upstream firm increases its investments, which results in lower input costs for its
downstream division. The increased competition in the downstream product market reduces the
counter-integrating firms' joint profits below their unintegrated level.
Finally, we address the potential hold-out problems among the upstream firms. Hold-out
problems may arise, because the vertical integration by a subset of firms typically raises the
remaining upstream firm's profits. Since the examination of the hold-out problems requires the
comparison of the integrated firms' joint profits and unintegrated firms' joint profits in a partially
integrated industry structure, we examine a simple Hotelling model in order to obtain explicit
solutions for firm profits. We show that a profitable but anticompetitive vertical integration can
arise in equilibrium without causing hold-out problems.
An important difference between our model and OSS's model is that our results hold both
under Cournot downstream competition and Bertrand downstream competition. In contrast,
vertical integration (with commitment) is ineffective in OSS's model because the remaining firms
always find it profitable to counter-merge.
Before introducing our model, we briefly and selectively review the related literature in
order to put our contribution into context. In addition to OSS's model, which is the starting point
of our work, several authors have recently proposed models of anticompetitive vertical
integration. Salinger (1988) examines the competitive effects of a vertical merger by Cournot
oligopolists. As in our model, upstream firms under non-integration earn positive profit margins
in Salinger's model. Hence, the elimination of double markups by the integrating firms play an
important role in both models. However, Salinger does not examine the possibility of a counter -
merger of unintegrated firms or hold-out problems among upstream firms.
Hart and Tirole (1990) allow for more complicated input supply contracts (in particular,
two-part tariff contracts) than simple linear prices considered in our model. The unrestricted use
of two-part tariff contracts has an important implication in Hart and Tirole's model: the low-cost
upstream firm supplies both downstream firms at marginal production costs (plus fixed fees) in
the non-integrated industry structure.5 Hence, vertical integration does not eliminate double
marginalization of prices. In our model, upstream firms charge above-cost input prices under
non-integration so that the elimination of the upstream margin is an important consequence of
vertical integration. Since the elimination of double markups tends to be procompetitive, our
model allows for a richer analysis of the competitive effects of vertical integration than in Hart
and Tirole's model (or in OSS's model), where vertical integration can be only anticompetitive.6
Bolton and Whinston (1993) focus on the supply assurance motives of vertical
integration. Bolton and Whinston show that vertical integration results in the foreclosure of the
unintegrated downstream firm by raising the integrating downstream firm's (relationship -
specific) investments. In contrast, we focus on the mechanism through which vertical integration
results in lower (industry-specific) investments by the integrating upstream firm.
More recently, Church and Gandal (1995) extend OSS's model to a setting where the final
good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the
value of the system depends on the availability of software. Church and Gandal show that the
integrated firm can increase its profits by making its software incompatible with the competing
hardware firm (without triggering counter-merger or causing hold-out problems). However, the
5
 Thus, as Klass and Salinger (1995) point out, Hart and Tirole (1990) can be better characterized
as a model of a upstream monopoly constrained by a potential entrant rather than as a model of
an active upstream duopoly.
6
 Indeed, Klass and Salinger (1995) argue that the recent literature on anticompetitive vertical
integration (such as OSS (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990)) does not provide any foundation for
distinguishing between procompetitive and anticompetitive vertical mergers. Our work is a step
toward providing such a foundation. See Riordan (1996) as well.
integrated firm in Church and Gandal's model must make a commitment not to make its software
compatible with the hardware of the unintegrated firm. In the absence of such a commitment, the
integrated firm may be tempted to sell its software to the remaining customers of the foreclosed
firm, thereby undermining the purpose of vertical integration.7
Riordan (1996) examines vertical integration by a dominant firm which faces price-taking
fringe firms. Riordan shows that vertical integration by a dominant firm necessarily results in the
foreclosure of fringe firms and a higher output price. However, fringe firms in Riordan's model
are not allowed to merge with the upstream input suppliers.
Finally, in an informal discussion of antitrust guidelines toward vertical mergers, Riordan
and Salop (1995, footnote 63 and pp. 548-550) suggest that vertical mergers may prevent cost
reductions by rivals. In our model, vertical mergers can indeed reduce cost-reducing investments
by the unintegrated upstream firm (see Proposition 1 for precise conditions). However, the
mechanism through which foreclosure arises in our model is through lower investments by the
integrated upstream firm, not the unintegrated upstream firm.
The current paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces the model and
the assumptions on the downstream product market Our key assumption is that the upstream
profit margin is small compared to the downstream profit margin. In Section 3, we examine
vertical integration without investments (or equivalently, with fixed investments). We show that
vertical integration does not take place for small upstream margins, because it reduces the
integrating firms' combined profits (regardless of whether or not vertical integration triggers
7
 In other words, in the absence of a commitment by the foreclosing firm, the existing customers
of the foreclosed firm may not switch to the foreclosing firm's hardware in the expectation that
the foreclosing firm will make its software available to them again. There are some other
differences between Church and Gandal's results and ours. First, Church and Gandal's analysis is
limited to a linear Hotelling downstream model; we examine general downstream demand
functions under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. Second, Church and Gandal show that
the hardware price of the integrating firm falls in the foreclosure equilibrium (unless the demand
for software variety is very inelastic). Hence, the welfare effects of vertical integration in
Church and Gandal's model is ambiguous, because the existing consumers of the foreclosing firm
are better off (although total social surplus is reduced). We obtain cleaner welfare results. Under
our conditions, vertical integration is anticompetitive on all accounts: all consumers are made
uniformly worse off and total social surplus is lowered.
counter-integration by the remaining firms). In Section 4, we introduce upstream investments
and show that both the profitability and the welfare implications of vertical integration change
dramatically in the presence of investments. Our key results establish that a privately profitable
but socially anticompetitive vertical integration can arise in equilibrium without triggering
counter-integration by the remaining firms or causing hold-out problems. We then illustrate
these results in a Hotelling model. In Section 5, we examine the robustness of our results. The
analysis in the preceding sections assumes that an upstream firm can price discriminate between
its current customer and the competitor's customer. In Section 5.1, we relax this assumption and
show that our basic results carry over to the case of no price discrimination. In Section 5.2, we
examine Cournot downstream competition in which the output producers compete by choosing
their quantities simultaneously. In contrast to OSS (1990), where vertical integration (even with
commitment) is ineffective under Cournot downstream competition, vertical integration in our
model can be both profitable and anticompetitive. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
As in OSS (1990), there are two upstream firms (U\ and 1/2) and two downstream firms
(Dl and D2). We introduce two changes to OSS's basic model. First, the upstream firms are
assumed to possess some market power in a non-integrated industry structure. We model the
upstream market power in the following simple way. The inputs produced by the two upstream
firms are ex ante identical, but production of a final output using a particular input requires input-
specific investments by a downstream firm (which cost some fixed amount). We examine a
situation where output producers have already made relationship-specific investments. As a
result of the input-specific investments, switching the input supplier costs a downstream firm s
per output produced. (Units are normalized so that one unit of input is used for producing one
unit of output.) Due to the ex-post switching cost, upstream firms have market power to raise
input prices over costs. Thus, vertical integration eliminates a double markup of profits on the
part of integrating firms. Our assumption enriches OSS's model by allowing the vertically
integrated firm to eliminate socially inefficient double marginalization. (In contrast, since there
are no switching costs in the OSS's model, price competition between the unintegrated upstream
firms brings the input prices to costs. Hence, there are no double markups that vertical
integration corrects.) Without loss of generality, suppose that Di has made a relationship -
specific investment with Ui, i = 1,2.
Second, we introduce investments by the upstream firms which reduce their cost of
supplying both downstream firms. (Hence, the upstream investments are industry-specific, in
contrast to the downstream investments which are relationship-specific.) As we show below, the
vertically integrated firm succeeds in raising the unintegrated downstream firm's input costs by
reducing its cost-reducing investments. Hence, investments provide a credible channel through
which a profitable but anticompetitive (both for consumer welfare and for overall social welfare)
vertical integration occurs.
Throughout the paper, we consider the case where the upstream margin (i.e., supplier
switching cost) is not "too high". We make this assumption, because it is well known that the
elimination of a large double markup raises both the profits of the merging firms and consumer
surplus under oligopoly.8 This finding carries over to the case with investments: the elimination
of a large double markup results in higher investment and lower prices. (See the discussion
following Proposition 1.) Since our analysis focuses on the potential anticompetitive effects of
vertical integration, we restrict our attention to a small upstream margin.9 (Assumption 4 below
provides the precise threshold value of the upstream margin.)
8
 Under monopoly, the elimination of a double markup is always profitable and procompetitive,
regardless of the size of the double markup.
9
 One can appeal to the relationship-specific investments incurred by the downstream firms for
justifying our assumption of small upstream margins. In our model, the equilibrium upstream
margin under non-integration is equal to the supplier switching cost. If the switching cost is very
high, the existence of another potential input supplier does not put any constraint on the current
supplier's ex-post opportunistic behavior. If a downstream firm expects that its supplier will
charge very high input prices, it may not make input-specific investments in the absence of
integration (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979). Our implicit assumption is
that the supplier switching cost is low enough for a non-integrated downstream firm to recoup its
relationship-specific investment.
The game consists of four stages.
Stage 1: Merger decisions
First, Ul and D1 decide to merge. UUl and D1 merge, then Ul and Z>2 have a chance to
counter-merge.10
Stage 2: Investment decisions
Ul and U2 simultaneously decide how much to invest in cost-reducing investments. Ui's initial
constant marginal cost of production is m. Ui can reduce its marginal cost of production to m; =
m - Ki by spending /(£•)• Assume that 7(0) = 0, /'(gj) > 0 and I"(Ki) > 0 for Ki > 0: the
investment cost function is increasing and convex. The upstream division of the merged firm
maximizes the joint profit of the upstream and downstream divisions.
Stage 3: Input-pricing decisions
Ul and U2 simultaneously announce the input prices at which they are prepared to supply D1
and D2. Each upstream firm announces two prices: one price for Dl and one price for D2. As in
the investment decision, the upstream division of the merged firm maximizes the joint profit of
the upstream and downstream divisions. Unlike in OSS's model, no commitment by the merged
firm is allowed.
Stage 4: Output-pricing decisions
10
 When we examine the potential hold-out problems, we modify Stage 1 to include a bidding
game between Dl and D2 for the control of UVs assets. For details, see Section 4.5.
10
Let q be Di's (constant) marginal cost of production. For expositional simplicity, we assume that
there are no production costs other than the input costs. D1 and D2 simultaneously announce the
output prices at which they are prepared to supply the consumers.
4i(pi* Pi) be the twice-continuously differentiable demand function for Di, with
dqi(ph P2)ldpi < 0 for qi > 0 and dqfah pfildpj >0,j* U for qi% qj > 0. Further assume that the
two demand functions are symmetric: dq\(p\,p2)/dp2 = &n(P2*P\)ldp\- Letp,(ci, C2) beDi's
equilibrium price and let qi(c\, C2) = qi(pi(c\, cfi, P2(c\, C2)) be Di's equilibrium output (For
simplicity, we assume that a unique equilibrium exists in the downstream product market.) Let
ftDiteh C2) = iPi' ci]<li be D*•'s profit and nui(m\> mi) = [q - mfiqi be Ui's profit (assuming that Ui
supplies Di). We make the following assumptions on the downstream equilibrium:
Assumption 1 0 < Fl *'
da
* i, andZis finite.
'
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For notational simplicity, arguments are dropped from Assumptions 2 and 3. Under
Assumption 1, a downstream firm's equilibrium price is more sensitive to changes in its own cost
than to changes in the competitor's cost An equal cost increase (weakly) reduces both
downstream firms' equilibrium outputs and profits. And a downstream firm's equilibrium profit
vanishes as both its cost and the competitor's cost approach infinity.
Assumption 2 concerns the curvatures of demand functions. Under Assumption 2.1, a
change in a downstream firm's unit cost has a (weakly) greater impact on its equilibrium output
when its cost is low or when the competitor's cost is high (that is, when its output is large). A
change in a downstream firm's unit cost has a (weakly) greater impact on the competitor's
equilibrium output when its cost is low. Under Assumption 2.2, a change in a downstream firm's
price has a (weakly) greater impact on its demand when its price is low or when the competitor's
price is low. A change in a downstream firm's price has a (weakly) greater impact on the
competitor's demand when its price is high. Finally, an equal increase in both firms' costs has a
(weakly) greater effect on a downstream firm's equilibrium price when its cost is high. Note that
Assumption 2 is trivially satisfied for a linear demand function qi = a- bpt + dpj,a>0 and b > d
> 0. (This demand function satisfies Assumption 1 as well.) For this linear demand function, d/b
is a measure of the "competitiveness" of the output market: as d/b increases, a change in the
competitor's price has a greater impact (relative to a change in own price) on a downstream firm's
demand.
Assumptions 3 and 4 are the key conditions in our paper. Assumption 3 requires that a
downstream firm's demand is significantly affected by a change in the competitor's price. For the
above linear demand function, it is not difficult to show that/?;(ci, Q ) =
a(2b + d) + b(2bci+dcj)
2 2 • ^ straightforward derivation shows that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied
if and only if 2cP- + bd - 2b2 > 0, or d/b > [-1 + Vf7 ]/4 « 0.78. Assumption 3.2 is satisfied if and
only if (P- + 2W-2&2 > 0, or d/b > -1 + V3 = 0.72.
12
Assumption 4 requires that the switching cost (which is the upstream profit margin under
non-integration) is small relative to the downstream profit margin. Under Assumption 4.1, the
integrated downstream firm, which enjoys a cost advantage of s over the unintegrated firm
(assuming that the two upstream firms have the same marginal costs), has a profit margin greater
than s. Assumption 4.2 states that an integrated downstream firm in a fully integrated industry
structure has an adjusted profit margin greater than s. For the above linear demand function with
d = b, Assumption 4.1 is satisfied if and only if s < 3a/2b and Assumption 4.2 if and only if s <
3aib. In summary, Assumptions 1 - 4 are satisfied for qi = a- bpi + bpj ifs< 3aJ2b. (In the
Hotelling model examined in Section 5, a = 1 and b = l/3t, where t is the unit transportation cost
Hence, all four assumptions are satisfied if s < (3/2)t.)n
We begin our analysis by establishing that, in the absence of cost-reducing investments,
vertical integration is not profitable for a small but positive switching cost This follows from
the lack of the input price commitment by the integrated firm. We then show that vertical
integration can become profitable in the presence of (industry-specific) investments by the
upstream firms. We establish conditions under which vertical integration results in uniformly
lower investments by both upstream firms, a higher input cost for the unintegrated downstream
firm, uniformly higher consumer prices, and a lower overall social welfare.
Let fc{}{ and n^j respectively denote Ws andZ>/'s profits under a non-integrated
industry structure, and let nyf and Ttpi respectively denote W s and Di's profits under a partially
integrated industry structure where Ul and Dl are integrated but U2 and D2 are not. Let mf*1
PI NI PI
and n%i be UVs input cost under non-integration and partial integration, and let c,- and cf be
Di's input price under non-integration and partial integration, respectively. We begin by
characterizing equilibrium input prices under the two industry structures. As stated earlier, we
11
 The reader may observe that we employ a long list of assumptions whereas OSS makes
Assumption 1 only. The absence of assumptions in OSS is more apparent than real, because they
assume that the upstream profit margin is equal to zero under non-integration. Hence,
Assumption 4 is trivially satisfied. Assumptions 2 and 3 are needed in our model because we
examine cost-reducing investments.
13
assume that s is small, in particular, that rrij + s is below Ws monopoly price to Di>j* i (under
all industry structures).
Lemma 1 (1) Assume that mq1 -s< mi1 < m™ + s. c™ = m™ + s and c-?1 = m^7 + s.
(2) Assume that m™ - s < mf1 < m™ + s. c[! = mf1 and c^1 = mf1 + s.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 follows from our assumption that each upstream firm can engage in price
discrimination between its current customer and the competitor's customer. Our main reason for
allowing for price discrimination is as follows. Suppose that U\ and Dl integrate and that UVs
cost stays unchanged at mi. Then, the integration between C/l and D1 has no effect on D2's
input price in the absence of commitment by Ul-Dl: it stays fixed at m\ + s. We obtain OSS's
result when s = 0. Thus, price discrimination allows us to stay as close as possible to OSS's setup
even after adding supplier switching costs. Furthermore, in the presence of supplier switching
costs, allowing price discrimination by the suppliers seems reasonable.12 Finally, price
discrimination by the upstream firms is not essential for our results. See Section 5.1.
3. Vertical integration without investments
We examine the profitability of vertical integration without investments. As the
following result makes clear, in the absence of price commitment, vertical integration does not
raise the combined profits of the merging firms for small switching costs.
12
 In the computer software industry, price discrimination between current customers and the
competitor's customers is prevalent (albeit for final consumers).
14
Lemma 2 Suppose that there are no upstream investments so that both upstream firms' costs are
fixed at mM . Further suppose that £i(mM, mM) > 0. Under Assumption 1, there exists ^i(mM) >
0 such that nff\ + 7t^[ < 7t{j[ + Ttjyi for 0 < s < Ji(mM), with the equality holding if and only if
Proof. Under non-integration, q = ci = nfi + s by Lemma 1. Since 91 (m^, m^) > 0, by
continuity, qi(mM + sy m^ + s) > 0 for s close to 0. Hence, njj[ + nz>\ > 0 for a small s. By the
envelope theorem, the effect of eliminating a small s on #^1 + 7t£>\ is given by
(1)
where ci = nfl1 and C2 = m ^ + s. Thus, for 5 close to 0, vertical integration by U\ and D\
reduces their combined profits. On the other hand, by Assumption 1, the combined profits of Ul
and Dl under non-integration approaches zero as s increases without bound. Since <?i(m^, m^1
+ s)> qiim^y mM) > 0, the integrated firm Ul-Dl earns a positive profit for a large s.




 * =si(mM) and x(j{ + n%[ > nffi + ^m for ° < s< si(
The idea behind Lemma 2 is simple. Eliminating a small double markup has no first-
order effect on the combined profits of the merging firms if the price of the competing
downstream firm is fixed. However, the competing downstream firm decreases its price in
response to the price reduction by the merging downstream firm. This price reduction by the
competing downstream firm has a negative first-order effect on the profits of the merging firms.
Interestingly, in OSS's model (with price commitment), a profitable vertical integration
arises without triggering a counter-integration precisely for the same reason as in Lemma 2. In
OSS's model, the integrated firm Ul-D\ commits to the input price of mM + ^ m^7), allowing U2
15
to raise its price to the same leveL13 Thus, vertical integration by Ul and D1 creates a small
double markup for U2 and D2 without affecting D Vs input cost (which is set at the efficient
level). The resulting increase in pi raises UVs and DYs combined profits. In contrast, in our
model, vertical integration by Ul and D1 eliminates a small double markup for themselves
without affecting D2's input cost The resulting decrease in p2 reduces UYs and D l's combined
profits.
From now on, we examine the case s< siim^) so that vertical integration does not occur
in the absence of investments. (A "forward-looking" Ul and D1 may carry out an unprofitable
merger (without investments) if (1) 1/2 and D2 merge in response; and (2) if the counter-merger
of U2 and D2 makes Ul and D1 jointly better f than under no merger. However, the counter-
merger of U2 and D2 reduces Ul's and Dl's joint profits under Assumption 1. Thus, if s<
sxirn^), vertical integration does not take place regardless of whether or not it triggers a counter-
integration.)
4. Vertical integration with investments
4.1. Investments and profits under a non-integrated industry structure
Assuming that K2 - s < K\ < K2 + s, the equilibrium input prices are given by c\ - m2 + s
= m - K2+ sand c2 = m\ + s = m - K\ + s. (SeeLemma 1.) Ul solves
We assume that there exists a symmetric interior equilibrium (K^I, K^1). K^1 is implicitly
defined by the first-order condition
13




where m^7 = m — K . Cost-reducing investments by unintegrated upstream firm £/l have two
effects on its profits. First, there are production cost savings, which are proportional to its
output Second, since the equilibrium input price of D2 is equal to m\ + s, C2 falls by the same
margin as m\. (However, c\ stays unchanged.) The reduction in C2 reduces UVs sales.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the upstream firms earn
= sqi(mN'+s,mN' + s) - I(KNI) (4)
and the downstream firms earn
= * = [p(mNI + symNI + s)-(mNI + s)]qi(mNI +symNI +s)^ (5)
4.2. Investments and profits under a partially integrated industry structure
Suppose that U\ and D\ integrate, but U2 and D2 remain unintegrated. Again assuming
that K.2 - s < K\ < K% + s, Lemma 1 shows that equilibrium input prices are given by c\ = m\ =
14
 Assumption 2.1 (with I"(K) > 0) guarantees that^j/{ is strictly concave in K\. However, due
to the switching cost s, the concavity of TT//{ in K\ does not guarantee that (K?*I, K™) is an
equilibrium. We need to check that U\ cannot increase its profit by investing K\ < K^I - s or K\
> K^ + s. We check these deviations in detail later in the linear Hotelling model. In the general
case, we assume that the investment equilibrium is characterized by the first-order conditions
derived under the assumption that neither upstream firm has a cost advantage exceeding s against
the other upstream firm.
15
 Since we are assuming an interior equilibrium, it must be the case that s >
I(KNI)/[ q\{mNI + s,mNI + s)]: the switching cost is not "too small." Recall the earlier
discussion that we focus our attention to "small" switching costs: s KsiimM). In Section 4.6, we
show that these two inequalities are compatible with each other in the Hotelling model.
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m - K\ and ci - m\ + s = m - K\ + s.16 Vertical integration by Ul and D\ changes c\ from
+ 5 to mi. But due to the lack of any commitment power on the part of the combined firm t/1-
Z)l, C2 is still equal to m\ + s. The integrated firm Ul-Dl solves
Max nffi + Jipi = [pi(mhml + s)~m{\qi(m^mi + s) - I{K{). (6)
Notice that the integrated firm Ul-Dl's maximization problem does not depend on K2. We
assume that the profit function is strictly concave in £i.17 The integrated firm's optimal
PIinvestment, denoted by K\ , is defined by
oK\
where mi1 = m - K\l\ with equality holding if /5Tjp/> 0. Cost-reducing investments have two
effects on the integrated firm's profits. First, production cost falls by the amount of the
integrated firm's output. Second, because the integrated firm cannot make price commitments, c
falls by the same margin as c\. The reduction in input costs results in a lowerp2» which reduces
the integrated firm's output. (Because p\ is set optimally, the change in p\ has no first-order
effects on C/l-Dl's profits.) The combined firm's profit is
= [P(m?ImfI+s)m?I]q(m?Im[I + s) /(tff7). (8)
The unintegrated upstream firm 1/2 solves
16
 Since we do not give any commitment power to the integrated firm, for logical consistency,
we allow the integrated firm to use the input of the competing upstream firm if its own input is
sufficiently more expensive than the competing upstream firm's input. However, if K2 - s < K\,
internal supply arises in equilibrium.
17
 For example, I"(K) > 0 guarantees the strict concavity of the profit function in the case of the
linear demand function.
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Max nff2 = [c2 -m2]q2(chc2) - I(K2) = [K2 -Kx +s]q2(mhml + s) - I(K2). (9)
K2
PIThe unintegrated upstream firm's equilibrium investment, denoted by K2 , satisfies
PI
f ^ f l ^ ) < 0, (10)
with equality holding if K2 > 0. We assume that K2 > 0.18 Since neither downstream firm's
input cost is affected by K% the unintegrated upstream firm sets its investments where production
cost savings are equal to the incremental investment cost. The unintegrated upstream firm U2's
profit is equal to
*U2 = (K^I-K[I+s)q2(rn[I,m[I + s) - I{K^) (11)
and the unintegrated downstream firm earns
= iP2(»ilW7 + s) - (mf7 + s)]q2(m[ 7,mf7 + 5). (12)
We are now prepared to examine the effect of vertical integration on investments, profits,
and consumer surplus.
4.2.1. The effect of vertical integration on investments
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 - 4, K[1 < KNI and K$! < KNI'.
18
 For example, if /'(0) = 0 and if q2(m,m + s) > 0, then K2l> 0. Notice that nijl2 is strictly
concave in K2 if and only if I"(K2) > 0.
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Proof. We first establish that Kf1 < Km. We then show that K*1 < KNI by using the fact
that K[! < KNI. By the concavity of the profit function, K? < KNI\f d^nU\+KD\\ <
 0 f o r





, NI NI obi(m +s,m +5)
<0
The first equality follows from equations (3) and (7). The first inequality follows from the first-
order Taylor expansion to q\ and the first two parts of Assumption 2.1 (all terms in the third and
fourth lines are evaluated at (mM, mM + s)). The second inequality follows from Assumption
4.1, and the final inequality from Assumption 3.1. Next,
PI PI x , NI NI dQiOn +s,m +s)[\m{1 +s) q2(mm +s,mm +s)+ s^+ r - 1 -
K2=KNI
^
 f NI NI N / NI NI x dqiim +^,m +s)< q2(miyi ,mL +s) - #2(m +s,mm +s) + s-±^ r-2 -
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where the first equality follows from equations (3) and (10), the first inequality from Assumption
1 and Kf1 < KNI, the second equality from the first-order Taylor expansion (0 < / < 5), and the
last inequality from the last part of Assumption 2.1. Q.E.D.
In general, vertical integration has conflicting effects on investment incentives of both
integrated and unintegrated upstream firms. First, the elimination of a double markup for the
integrated firms increases the output of the integrated downstream firm and decreases the output
of the unintegrated downstream firm. Since the production cost savings are proportional to the
output produced, the elimination of a double markup has the direct effect of raising the
investment incentives of the integrated upstream firm and reducing the investment incentives of
the unintegrated upstream firm.
Second, vertical integration has a more subtle strategic effect on investment incentives.
Consider the integrated firm first. Due to the lack of any commitment power on the part of the
integrated firm Ul-Dl, C2 falls by the same margin as c\ (= mi). The lower input costs result in
lowerp2, which reduces the Ul-DVs profits by [pj - JflJ-^M - " • + -r^- \- On the other hand,
dp2{dcl dc2\
when U\ and D1 are not integrated, only C2 falls as Ul makes cost-reducing investments. Since
UYs equilibrium profit margin under non-integration is equal to s, the loss from lower C2 is given
by s-~- = s\ ?•* T 1 + L** ? ^ >. Under Assumptions 1 and 4.1, the profit loss through a lower
C [ 0C2 0P2 0C2)
output is greater for U\-Dl than for Ul. Assumptions 2.2 (the first two parts) and 3.1 ensure that
the indirect negative effect dominates the direct positive effect so that vertically integrated
upstream firm reduces its investments.
For the unintegrated firm (72, vertical integration by Ul and £>1 eliminates the negative
strategic effect of investments (-s—^-), because c\ no longer depends on K2. However, under
dc
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Assumption 2.1 (the last part), the direct effect of a lower qi (weakly) dominates the strategic
effect, thereby reducing U2S investments. The reduction in K\ (weakly) reduces the equilibrium
output of D2y further reducing Uz's investments.19
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the effect of vertical integration on investments. The best
response curves are drawn under the assumption that Kri - s < K\ < K2 + s. Under Assumptions 1
and 2, best response functions under the non-integrated industry structure, denoted by Ki {Kj),
slope upward.20 Ul-DYs best response function under the partially integrated industry structure,
denoted by Ki!(K2),is vertical. (Under Assumption 1-4, it lies to the left of K^iK1*1), as
illustrated in Figure 1.) UTs best response function under a partially integrated industry
structure, denoted by K^iKi), slopes upward under Assumption 1 and lies below Ki\Ki) at
^1 = ^A7» under Assumptions 1 and 2. (For simplicity, the best response curves of the
unintegrated firms are drawn as linear lines.)
19
 Under Assumptions 1 - 4 , the positive direct effect is dominated by the negative strategic
effect for C/l, while the opposite is true for V2. This particular result is not necessary for our
main points (i.e., privately profitable vertical integration with investments can be socially
anticompetitive). As will become clear, what is crucial for our results is that vertical integration
reduces K\. There are two senses in which this is true. First, since Ki does not affect the input
prices of downstream firms under partial integration, K.% does not affect either the-integrated
firm's profits, the unintegrated downstream firm's profits, or the consumer surplus. Hence,
whether or not vertical integration reduces Ki has no relevance for the private profitability of
vertical integration and for its effect on final consumers. Second, in the Hotelling model
examined in Section 5, vertical integration has no net effect on K2, but still can be
anticompetitive. The only role that reduced investment by U2 plays in our model is that it
enables us to obtain a clean result on overall social surplus (Proposition 6).
20
 An increase in K\ reduces C2- Thus, qi increases, thereby raising the direct benefit of
increasing £2 to XJ2. Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure thnt tter ptnnfifflr negative strategic effects
are dominated by the positive direct effect
22




4.2.2. The profitability of vertical integration
We now show that investments can turn an otherwise unprofitable vertical integration
into a profitable one.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists s\(mNI) such that K{J[ + n&\ >
#{ for J i(mM) <s<
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that for s= ^i(m^), vertical integration without investments (or equivalently,
vertical integration with fixed investments KM) does not change the combined profits of Ul and
Dl (Lemma 2). Since the combined firm Ul-Dl chooses investments in order to maximize their
joint profits, the resulting change in their investments must increase their joint profits. (Under a
partially integrated industry structure, any change in the unintegrated upstream firm's
investments does not affect the integrated firm's profits.)
It is instructive to use the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) in discussing the
effects of vertical integration in our model. Given that D2 does not exit the industry, Ul-Dl can
increase its profits by adopting a "puppy dog" strategy which reduces price competition. Vertical
integration without investments is not profitable for small switching costs because it intensifies
price competition. In contrast, vertical integration with investments can be profitable because the
integrated firm succeeds in raising the rival downstream firm's costs (Salop and Scheffman,
1983; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986) by reducing its investments.
We now turn to the conditions under which counter-integration does not occur.
4.3. Investments and profits under a fully integrated industry structure
4.3.1. The effect of counter-integration on investments
24
Suppose that Ul and D2 integrate in response to the merger of Ul and D\. Again
assuming that K2 - s < K\ < K.% + s> the equilibrium input prices are given by c\ = m\ = m - K\
and C2 = mi = m - K2. Counter-integration by Ul and D2 changes ci from m\ + s to m.2. Ul-
D1 solves
Max n{}{ + ni)i= [pi(m1,m2)-m1]^1(m1,m2)- I(K{). (13)
K
A symmetric equilibrium (KFI, KFI) is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
(14)
where mF /= m-K , with equality holding for ^TF/ > 0. Under Assumption 1, an interior
symmetric equilibrium exists if/'(0) = 0. We assume that indeed KFI > 0. The equilibrium
profits of the merged firms are given by
D\ = *V1 + * 2 = [A(^ F / .m F / ) - mFI]qi(mFI,mFI) - 7(/i:F/). (15)
The next result shows that counter-integration by f/2 and D2 increases investments by the
already-integrated firm Ul-Dl.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 - 4, K[J < KFI.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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In general, counter-integration by U2 and D2 has two conflicting effects on Ul-DYs
investment incentives. First, counter-integration by U2 andZ)2 eliminates double markup for
themselves, thereby reducing ci and q\. Hence, counter-integration reduces the direct benefit of
investments for Ul-Dl. Second, however, C2 is equal to m,2 under counter-integration so that C2
no longer decreases with K\. This second effect raises Ul-DYs investment incentives.
Intuitively, when s is small (Assumption 4.2) and when D l's demand is significantly affected by
the competitor's price (Assumption 3.2), the second positive effect dominates the first negative
effect so that Ul-DYs investments increase under counter-integration by U2 and D2.
Counter-integration by U2 and D2 has generally ambiguous effects on UTs incentives as
well. First, the elimination of double markup increases qi- Second, the unintegrated U2 in the
partially integrated industry structure sets its investments where the direct benefit is equal to
marginal investment costs (equation (10)). In contrast, the integrated firm U2-D2 now takes into
account the negative effect through a lower p\ (equation (14)). However, when s is small and
when a competitor's price has a significant effect on a downstream firm's demand, counter-
integration reduces UTs investments.21 Figure 2 illustrates the effect of counter-integration on
PJ PIinvestments, assuming that K^ > K . Figure 2 also assumes that the best response functions
under the fully integrated industry structure slope downward.2 2 23
21
 One can establish precise conditions under which K^} > KFI. These conditions are
analogous to Assumptions 3 - 4 . However, since our subsequent analysis does not depend on
this particular result, we do not report the conditions here.
22
 As £ 2 increases, C2 falls without any effect on c\. Hence, q\ decreases, thereby reducing the
direct benefit of investments to Ul-Dl.
23
 The reader will notice that counter-integration changes investments from strategic
complements into strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). This
particular result is irrelevant for the foreclosure effects of vertical integration. In Section 5.1, we
examine the case of no price discrimination in which investments are always strategic substitutes.
It will become clear that what is crucial is the effect of counter-integration on equilibrium K\, not
the effect on the slope of K\(K£).
26
Figure 2 The effect of counter integration on equilibrium investments
0
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4.3.2. The profitability of counter-integration
We now establish conditions under which counter-integration is not profitable for U2 and
D2. Let S2(m\I) be the critical value of the switching cost such that the counter-merger of Ul
PI Pi
and D2 does not change their joint profits when marginal costs are fixed at (mj ,m\ ). (Recall
Lemma 2.) We now show that counter-integration is not profitable for a small s.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-4, there exist $2 (rn\ ) > ^2(ml ) s u c ^ m a t nU2 + nD2
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, there are two components to the effects of counter-integration on UTs and
D2's combined profits. First, holding investments (and thus marginal production costs) constant,
PI
counter-integration eliminates the double markup. For small switching costs (0 < s < S2 {m\ ),
to be precise), however, the elimination of the double markup reduces UTs and D2's combined
profits. Second, both Ul and U2 adjust their investments. Since Ul increases its investments, c\
is lower under counter-integration. As a result, UTs and D2's joint profits decrease.
Propositions 2 and 4 together show that a profitable vertical integration can occur in
PI
equilibrium without triggering counter-integration, provided that the two intervals [ ^ ("H )»
him\ )] ^ d [s\(m )» sl(m )1 overlap. In Section 4.6, we show that these two intervals
indeed overlap in the Hotelling model.
4.4. Welfare effects of vertical integration with investments
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This subsection examines the effects of vertical integration on competitors, final
consumers and overall welfare. W show that profitable vertical integration can make final
consumers uniformly worse off and reduce overall social welfare.
4.4.1. The effect of vertical integration on unintegrated firms
Comparison of equations (5) and (12) show that vertical integration by Ul and D\ makes
the unintegrated downstream firm unambiguously worse off.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-4, n^i < njyi for s > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since the input cost of the unintegrated downstream firm rises by a greater amount than
the input cost of the integrated downstream firm (if it rises at all), the unintegrated downstream
firm earns a lower profit.
The effect of vertical integration on the unintegrated upstream firm is less clear. Recall
that vertical integration by Ul and D1 reduces qi. Since the direct benefit of investments is
PI Piproportional to output produced, the reduction in #2 reduces U2's profits. Hence, if K2 < K\ ,
Pithen vertical integration by Ul and D\ lowers UTs profits. However, K^ may be greater than
PI PI PI PI
K\ . (For example, K2 > K\ in the Hotelling model examined in the next section.) If K2
is sufficiently bigger than K\ , U2 earns higher profits as a result of vertical integration by Ul
and£>l.
4.4.2. The effect of vertical integration on final consumers and overall social welfare
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Vertical integration by Ul and Dl raises ci by K - K( and changes c\ by K -
KPI - s. If KNI - KP1 > s, then both c\ and ci are higher under the partially integrated industry
structure than under the non-integrated industry structure. In this case, both p\ and p2 rise,
making final consumers uniformly worse off. Even if K - Kp < s so that vertical integration
reduces ci, final consumers end up uniformly worse off if K - K\ is sufficiently large
compared to s. The next assumption states the precise conditions under which vertical
integration results in uniformly higher output prices.
Assumptions If KNI - KXPI < ,, then KNI - K?1 > s/(l + a), where a = ^ c ^ 2 > Q
dp(cC)/oc
for m - K{!< C\ < m - KNI + s and m - K[! + s<C2<m-KNI+ s.
Assumption 5 is satisfied in the Hotelling model [qi = l + (pj- pi)/3t] if and only if K
K(1 > (2/3)s. For the case of the quadratic investment cost function [I(K) = (y/2)^2], we show
that Assumption 5 is satisfied if and only if s < 3t/(2ty+ 1). (See Section 4.6.)
Proposition 6 (1) Under Assumptions 1-5, vertical integration by Ul and£>l makes final
consumers uniformly worse off by raising both output prices.
(2) Under Assumptions 1-5, vertical integration by Ul and D\ reduces overall social welfare.
Proof. (1) We show that both output prices rise when s > K - Kf1 > s/(l + a). Starting from
(ch C2) = (ni - K + s, m - K + J ) , consider an infinitesimal change in input costs (dc\, dc2)
KNI -KPI -s
= (fide, dc), where P = j ^ — 1
 pi < 0 and dc > 0. The resulting change in p\ is given by
K — K\
dpi= {P^ + ^ ldc = ^{P + a}dc >0 if and only if KNI - K?1 > s/(l + a). Wecan[ dC\ dC2) dc\
obtain the effect of vertical integration on p\ by integrating dp\ldc from 0 to K - K\ .
Hence, p\ rises as a result of the vertical integration by Ul and Dl. Now, by symmetry, the
30
actual change in p2 will be the same as the hypothetical change in p\ if c\ were to increase by
K - #i and c% were to decrease by s - K + K\[ . Since the actual change in p\ is positive
(when c\ falls by s - KNI + K^and ci rises by KNI - Kf!)y and since 0 < dp\lc2 < dp\lc\, the
above hypothetical change in p\ is positive.
(2) Decompose the effects of vertical integration into two steps. First, reduce both
investments to the new lower levels. Second, increase both output prices to the new higher
levels. We show that both changes reduce social welfare. First, holding prices constant at the
levels under non-integration, the socially optimal level of symmetric investments Ki (= Kj = K*)
equate the direct marginal benefit (qfi with marginal costs of investments (/'(AT;)). Equation (3)
shows that K^1 < K*. Hence, a reduction in investments reduces social welfare (holding prices
constant). Second, holding investments fixed at the new lower levels, the increase in prices
reduces social welfare, because equilibrium outputs are further decreased from socially efficient
levels (at which prices equal marginal production costs). Q.E.D.
Under Assumptions 1-5, vertical integration raises output prices (which are already too
high for efficient consumption) and reduces investments (which are already too low for
production cost minimization), thereby lowering social welfare unambiguously. Notice that
Assumption 5 is not necessary for vertical integration to reduce overall social welfare. Even if
Assumption 5 is violated (so that consumers of good 1 are better off), overall social welfare may
be lower as a result of vertical integration.
4.5. Hold-out problems
Finally, we examine the potential hold-out problems between the upstream firms. Hold-
out problems may arise if the integration by U\ and Dl raises U2's profits. Indeed, in the
Hotelling model examined in the next section, the merger by Ul and Dl benefits U2. In order to
examine this issue, we modify Stage 1 of the game, where the merger decisions occur. Before
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incurring relationship-specific investments, D1 and D2 engage in a first-price bidding game for
£/l.24 A tie is broken in favor of Dl. If Ul agrees to be acquired by a downstream firm, the
losing downstream firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to U2. (If Ul rejects both offers, and
thus remains unintegrated, U2 does not have a chance to merge with a downstream firm.) Then,
each downstream firms make relationship-specific investments for one upstream firm. (A
merged downstream firm makes relationship-specific investments for its upstream division.)
In the bidding game for the control of t/1, each downstream firm is willing to bid up to
PI PI PI
+ jTjyi) - 7i£>2* the difference between the winner's payoff and the loser's payoff. By the
tie-breaking rule, Ul accepts Dl's bid of (n{/[ + Trjrn) - npi- Since UTs resulting payoff is
PI PI PI PI PI
nU2* hold-out problems between the upstream firms do not arise if n\j\ + 7tj)\ > 7ty2 + ^2
For general demand and cost functions, it is hard to compare profits across firms. In order to
derive explicit conditions under which hold-out problems do not arise, we now turn to the
Hotelling model.
4.6. An example: Hotelling model
Consider a linear city of length one. The consumers, with total measure 2, are uniformly
distributed along the city. The two downstream firms are located at the two corner points.
Consumers have identical valuations of the two goods, equal to v. Each consumer has a one unit
of demand. A consumer incurs a transportation cost t per unit length. We assume that v is
sufficiently high so that the entire market is covered under all industry structures. Then the
demand for Di is given by qi(ph P2) = 1 + (Pj - Pi)lt,j * i. It is straightforward to derive the
downstream equilibrium: pi(cn Q ) = t + (2c/ + CJ)/3 and qi{c\, ci) = 1 + (q - ct)/3tj * i. Notice
that the equilibrium outputs (and profit margins) depend only on the cost differences but not on
their levels. In particular, #(c, c) = 1 for all c: in a symmetric equilibrium, each downstream
24
 We make this assumption to put D1 and D2 on equal footing in bidding for Ul. If the
downstream firms bid for Ul after they make relationship-specific investments, then D l enjoys
an undue advantage over D2 as a result of the switching cost
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firm's output is equal to 1 regardless of the production costs. This fact simplifies derivations
greatly.
Under a non-integrated industry structure, the symmetric equilibrium investment K^1 is
defined by u = 1 - s/3t- TiKr1) = 0. The upstream firms' profits are 7tjj[ = n^i = s-
I(K ) and the downstream firms' profits are 7t^\ = 7tjyi = t
Under a partially integrated industry structure, the integrated firm Ul-Dl invests 0,
d(nPI +nPI)
because its first-order condition is given by v m ^ = -I'{K{) < 0, for all K\ > 0. The
oK
PIdnPI
unintegrated firm's equilibrium investment satisfies u2 = 1 - s/3t - V{KPI) - 0. Notice that
0K2
Kp = f^1 '• vertical integration by Ul and D1 does not change the unintegrated firm's
investments. The integrated firm's profits are njj\ + n$\ = t[l + s/3t]2, the unintegrated
Pi PI Pi
upstream firm's profits are nyi = {K^ +s)[l-s/3t] - 7(^2 ) and the unintegrated downstream
firm's profits are n*pi - r[l - s/3t]2.
Finally, in a fully integrated industry structure, the symmetric equilibrium investment KFJ
is defined by K m DV = 2/3 - I\KFI) = 0. The equilibrium profits of the merged firms
are given by njj[ + n^\ = ^U2 + ^D2 = *- KKFI).
Comparison of UYs and D l's joint profits under non-integrated and partially integrated
industry structures show that siim^) = 3r. (Notice that siim^) does not depend on m^.)
PiSimilarly, J2( m\ ) = (3/2)*. In order to obtain explicit solutions for the other critical values of
the switching cost in Propositions 2 and 4, we examine the following two cost functions:
I(K) = 7*2/2, y> 0, for K< 1/yandI{K) = ~, for K> 1/y, (16)
! 3, ! \ ]
with max{ —, so} < s < , and — <U where sQ s *• • J—; and
7 2?y + l 7 ( 6 * 7 1 )
33
- l ] , 7> 0, for K> 0, (17)
with .y = 2, 7= 0.02, and 2.77 < t < 16.76.
Proposition 7 In the Hotelling model with the above two investment cost functions, a profitable
but anticompetitive (both for consumers and for aggregate efficiency) vertical integration arises
in equilibrium. Counter-integration by the remaining firms does not happen, because it reduces
their joint profits. Hold-out problems among the upstream firms do not arise.
Proof. See Appendix A.
For the first investment cost function, no upstream firm (merged or unmerged) invests
more than 1/ydue to the prohibitive costs. Since s > 1//, the first-order conditions derived in the
text indeed characterize equilibrium investments, (s > 1/y also guarantees that the upstream
firms earn positive profits under non-integration.) When s < 3t/[2ty+ 1], vertical integration
raises both Ul-DVs joint profits and all output prices. When s > sQy hold-out problems do not
arise. Finally, t > 1/y guarantees that the interval of switching costs for which anticompetitive
vertical integration takes place is not empty. (Notice that all the conditions depend only on sit
and ty)
The first investment cost function is somewhat restrictive, because the investment cost
function suddenly becomes very steep after a critical value.25 The second cost function avoids
25
 For the quadratic investment cost function without this sudden increase, whenever vertical
integration by U\ and D1 raises their joint profits, the unintegrated firm U2 finds it profitable to
increase its investment and supply both D1 and D2 under partial integration. While vertical
integration by U\ and D1 still forecloses the unintegrated firm D2 and makes consumers
uniformly worse off, overall social welfare is higher as a result of integration. Of course, this
cannot happen if we assume that vertical integration is a commitment to internal supply by the
integrating firms. Since we do not allow the integrated firm to make a price commitment, for
logical consistency, we allow the integrated firm to buy its inputs from the competing upstream
firm.
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this discontinuous increase in marginal cost; instead investment cost increases exponentially.26
The proof of Proposition 7 shows that one can find parameter values for which profitable but
anticompetitive vertical integration arises in equilibrium.
5. Extensions
5.1. No price discrimination
The preceding analysis assumes that the upstream firms can exercise price discrimination
between current and prospective customers. As we have pointed out earlier, the main reason for
allowing for price discrimination is to keep the model as close as possible to OSS's original
setup. In this section, we demonstrate that price discrimination is not essential to our results.
Under no price discrimination, the upstream profit margin under non-integration i& not
directly related to the supplier switching cost However, as in the case of price discrimination,
the unintegrated upstream firm's profit margin under partial integration is equal to the supplier
switching cost. Hence, unless the upstream profit margin under non-integration happens to be
equal to the supplier switching cost, vertical integration (without commitment) can increase or
decrease the unintegrated downstream firm's input price in our model.
Since our purpose of introducing the supplier switching cost is to parametrize the
upstream market power under non-integration in a simple way, it seems reasonable to assume
that the upstream profit margin under non-integration is equal to the supplier switching cost.
Then, vertical integration without investments (and without commitment) does not change the
unintegrated upstream firm's market power over the unintegrated downstream firm.
In Appendix B, we show that our results in the previous sections continue to hold under
no price discrimination when the upstream profit margin under non-integration is equal to the
supplier switching cost. While we believe that this assumption is reasonable, one may still argue
26
 But the analysis is much more complicated than in the first cost function, because we need to
check "jumpy" deviations to a very high investment level or to a very low level. See the proof of
Proposition 7.
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that it is restrictive. We show that our results do not depend on this particular assumption. This
is done in the Hotelling model. We demonstrate that anticompetitive vertical integration occurs
in equilibrium under no price discrimination even when the upstream profit margin under non-
integration is not equal to the supplier switching cost
5.2. Cournot downstream competition
So far, we have assumed that the downstream firms compete in prices. In this section, we
demonstrate that our results continue to hold even if the downstream firms compete in quantities.
This is in sharp contrast to the standard result in OSS (1990), where vertical integration (even
with commitment) is ineffective under Cournot downstream competition. In the Cournot
oligopoly, outputs are strategic substitutes (see Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985)
under mild conditions. Then, counter-integration (without investments) is always profitable,
because the already-integrated firm reduces its output in response to the output expansion by the
newly-integrated firm. Thus, in the absence of investments, vertical integration always triggers
counter-integration. For small switching costs, the net effect is to reduce the joint profits of the
firms which initiate vertical integration.27
We show that upstream investments can reverse the above result Under conditions that
parallel Assumptions 1 - 4, we show that the initial vertical integration reduces the integrating
upstream firm's investment incentives but counter-integration restores them. (These results
parallel Propositions 1 and 3 in Section 4.) If the already-integrated firm increases its investment
by a substantial amount, counter-integrating firms' joint profits are reduced from the unintegrated
levels.
27
 This result follows from Assumption 1. The effect of full integration (compared with no
integration) is to reduce the input transfer price of both downstream firms by the amount of
switching cost. Both downstream firms expand their output, further reducing the industry profit
from the monopoly level.
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These results are reported in Appendix C. There, we begin by listing the modified
assumptions. As in the earlier sections, the key assumption is that the upstream profit margin
under non-integration (which equals the switching cost) is smaller than adjusted downstream
profit margin. (For simplicity, we assume that price discrimination by the upstream firms is
feasible.) Along with the effects of integration and counter-integration on investments, we
derive conditions under which vertical integration raises the output price and reduce overall
social surplus. Here, we illustrate these results in an example with linear demand functions and
quadratic investment cost functions:
Proposition 8 Consider a homogeneous-good Cournot downstream oligopoly with linear
demand functions [P(Q) = a- Q, where Q = q\ + q2 is the industry output] and quadratic
27y + 3 3 r - 1 0




 f where A s . Then, a profitable but anticompetitive (both for consumers
3 / 5
and for aggregate efficiency) vertical integration arises in equilibrium without causing counter-
integration by the remaining firms or causing hold-out problems among the upstream firms.28
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 8 shows that a profitable but anticompetitive vertical integration arises in
equilibrium for switching costs which are not "too small or too large". Intuitively, when the
switching costs are high, counter-merger is always profitable, because the unintegrated firms
have a high double markup. Eliminating a high double markup increases the combined profits of
the counter-merging firms, even if the already-integrated firm responds by increasing its cost-
reducing investments. The condition that the switching cost is not too small is required for a.
more technical reason: it ensures that the investment game under non-integration has a pure-
28
 Notice that there is no kink in the investment cost function.
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strategy Nash equilibrium. (Since an upstream firm's profit margin under non-integration is
equal to the switching cost, if the switching cost is too low, the upstream firms may earn a
negative profit if both invest positive amounts in cost reduction.)
We conclude this section by drawing the reader's attention to the qualitative similarity
between Proposition 7 (Hotelling downstream competition) and Proposition 8 (Cournot
downstream competition). This similarity is particularly striking, because many results in
oligopoly are known to be sensitive to the modes of competition (that is, price vs. quantity
competition).
In both propositions, integrating firms succeed in raising the input price of the
unintegrated downstream firm by reducing its investment in cost reduction. This profitable
vertical merger is anticompetitive because it both raises output price(s) and reduces investments
which already fall short of the socially optimal levels. Counter-merger is not profitable because
it severs the linkage between the already-integrated firm's input cost and the newly-integrating
downstream firm's input price. Thus, counter-merger induces the already-integrated firm to
increase its cost-reducing investments, thereby reducing the newly-integrating firms' profits.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that, even without any commitment power on the part
of the merging firms, privately profitable but socially anticompetitive vertical integration can
arise in equilibrium. We have shown that cost-reducing investments by upstream firms provide a
credible channel through which the integrated firm can raise the input price of the unintegrated
downstream firm. We have constructed a simple yet tight equilibrium model of anticompetitive
vertical integration which addresses the main criticisms of the Chicago school on the classical
vertical foreclosure theory, including the possibility of the counter-merger of the unintegrated
firms and the potential hold-out problems among the upstream firms.
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In sum, our analysis shows that the classical vertical foreclosure theory can be put on firm
analytical foundations.29 While our model builds upon the important contribution by OSS
(1990), our results are substantially stronger than theirs. First, we have dispensed with the
problematic assumption that the integrated firm can make a price commitment. Second, we have
shown that anticompetitive vertical integration can occur in equilibrium even under Cournot
downstream competition (without inducing counter-merger by the remaining firms or causing
hold-out problems among the upstream firms).
While our model shows that a profitable but anticompetitive vertical integration can
indeed arise in equilibrium, it is without question that a profitable vertical integration can be
procompetitive at the same time. Even in our simple model, investments by the integrated
upstream firm could increase (rather than decrease) if the double markups under non-integration
are sufficiently high. In that case, vertical integration can result in both reduced output prices
and higher overall social welfare.30 Therefore, even our simple model indicates that the antitrust
authorities should weigh the potential efficiency gains (including the elimination of double
markups) of vertical integration against the possible anticompetitive effects (increased input
prices for the unintegrated downstream firms).
29
 In a related paper, we show that anticompetitive vertical integration can also arise in a setting
where upstream firms choose input specifications. We show that the vertically integrated firm
can succeed in raising the rival downstream firm's costs by tailoring its input to the specific
needs of its downstream division. An unintegrated firm, on the other hand, chooses a
"generalized" input which can be used for any downstream firm. For details, see Choi and Yi
(1996).
30
 Of course, we do not need investments to obtain these results. The main novelty of our work
is to establish conditions under which vertical integration with investments results in higher
prices and a lower social surplus.
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Appendix A
NI1. Proof of Lemma 1 (1) In equilibrium, Ul quotes m{Vi toD2 and m™ + s to D\ (and
similarly for Ul). (2) Since the integrated firm Ul-Dl cannot make any price commitment, it is
PT
{willing to supply the competing downstream firm D2 at cost, i.e., at m  . Hence, Ul charges
m\ + s to D2. Similarly, the internal transfer price of Ul-Dl is given by its cost Q.E.D.
2. Proof of Proposition 2 For s = si(mM),
[pl(m-KNI s)-(m-KNI)]qi(m-KNI + s,m-KNI
7tm + 7C
The first inequality follows from K\ < KNI and the strict concavity of Ul-DVs profit function
in K\. The second equality follows from Lemma 2. By continuity, there exists a critical value of
the switching cost s\(m ) such that vertical integration with investments raises U\-DYs joint
NIprofits for si(mNI) <s< si(mM). Q.E.D.
3. Proof of Proposition 3
If K\ =0, then the proof follows from our assumption that K > 0. Thus, suppose that
0. It is straightforward to show that
function of C2 under Assumption 2.2. We have








The first equality follows from equations (7) and (14). The first inequality follows from the first-
order Taylor expansion to q\ and the last part of Assumption 2.1 (all terms are now evaluated at
(mFI,mFI)). The second inequality follows from Assumption 4.2, and the final inequality from
Q.EX>.Assumption 3.2.
5. Proof of Proposition 4 Consider the following maximization problem of U1-D2:
Max
K2
Notice the similarity between the above maximization problem and Ul-DVs problem given in
(6). In both cases, the competing downstream firm's input price is controlled by the integrated
firm's investment The only difference is the competing downstream firm does not have a double
markup in (6'). We assume that the maximization problem in (16) is strictly concave in K2 so
that it has a unique solution K2. The next result shows that K2 ^ K{ .








The first inequality follows from equation (7). The second inequality follows from
Assumption 1 (^i is an increasing function of c2) and Assumption 2.2
is a weakly decreasing function of
 C 2) . Q.E. D.
We now turn prove Proposition 4, using Lemma A-l. From equation (10) and I"{K) > 0,
Aip/]ft(mf'.mf7 + J) = [^7 - Kf'mK?) > UK?) - UK?1). For s = f7
+ s) - (mf7 + s)]q2{m^^ + s) + [K? - K?1 + s]q2(m[1',
f7The second equality follows from J = 52 (mf7). The first inequality follows from
- £fI]q2(mi /,m1p/ + 5) > /(^rf7) - /(^rf7). The second inequality follows from the strict
concavity of K U 2 + ^ 2 in #2 and from K2 < K[! < KF1'. By continuity, we can find f1
) such that counter-integration reduces UTs and D2's combined profits for ^(mf1) > s
> 52(mf7). Recall that counter-integration with fixed investments reduces UTs and DTs
combined profits for 0 < s < s2(nti ). Hence, the second equality becomes a strict inequality for
0 f7)- Q.E.D.
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6. Proof of Propositions Under the conditions in Proposition 3, KNI > K\l. Vertical
integration increases C2 from m - K + s to m - K\ + s and changes c\ from m - K + s to
m - K\ . Decompose the changes into two steps. First, raise both c\ and C2 from m - K + s
to m - K\ + s. Second, reduce c\ by s. Both steps reduce D2's profits by Assumption 1.
Q.E.D.
7. Proof of Proposition 7
(1) I(K) = 7*2/2, y > 0, for K £ Vyand /(#) = » , for A" > 1/y. Since no upstream firm
invests more than 1/y (< s), no upstream firm enjoys a cost advantage over J against the
competitor. Hence, the first-order conditions derived in the main text indeed characterize
equilibrium and KNI = (1 - s3t)/y. Vertical integration with investments strictly increases UVs
3t
and D l's joint profits for 0 < s < .31 From the proof of Proposition 4, counter-integration
reduces UTs and DTs joint profits for 0 < s < 3t/2. (Assumptions 1 - 4 are satisfied if and only if
3r
s < (3/2)f.) Since ty> 1, counter-integration does not occur for 0 < s < . Assumption 5 is
2ty + l
satisfied if and only if KNI > (3/2)5, which in turn holds if and only if s < . And 7t{j{ +
2ty + 1
71Dl > KU2 + nm # and o n l v # (f>*Y " ^ 2 + 6(*Y + Vts ~ ^ > ®- Since ty> 1, this inequality
is satisfied if and only if s > SQ.
(2) I(K) = )f<?*-l], y> 0, for K > 0. K™ = log 1"* 7 3* and KFI = log—.
Y 3 /
(Step 1) (.K^, KM) is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium under the non-integrated
industry structure. We need to show that investing Ki > K^1 + s or K2 < f^1 -sis not a
profitable deviation for f/2. Investing Ki < K^1 - s is not feasible if J^1 < 5, which holds if and
only if 1 - sBt<.ye?. This last inequality holds for s = 2 and y = 0.2 for all t > 0, because 0.2e2
1.48. If U2 invests Ki > K\ + sy it supplies Dl at m\ - s and D2 at m\ + s. It solves
31
 Notice that Proposition 2 does not apply directly to the Hotelling model, because for s =
5i(mM) = 3?, we have ^ = 0. (Proposition 2 requires that #W > 0.) Nonetheless, for the
values of the switching costs identified in the text, vertical integration is profitable with
investments but not without investments.
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Max it$i= [K2-Ki-s]ql(mhm[+s)+[K2-Kl + s]q2(mhml+s)- I{K2). (20
When U\ invests K^1, U2's best-response investment K2! satisfies
k$l) =0. (3')
For the Hotelling model, q\ + q2 = 2. Hence, X^7 = log(2/ y). However, K2! < K™ + .s if and
only if 1 - ^/3 r > 2/es. This last inequality holds for s = 2 if and only if f > 0.77 (approximately).
(Step 2) (0, A^7) 15 f/*£ unique Nash equilibrium under the partially integrated industry
structure. If U2 invests K2 > K\ + s, it supplies D\ at m\ - s and D2atmi + s, asin Step 1.
Hence, (72's profit function is given by (2 ) and its optimal investment is K2 = K2 . When A"i
= 0, L '^s profit from investing K2l is £{}{ =(K2I - s)(l + s/3t) + (K2WI + s)(l - sBt) - I(k^)
= 21og(2//) - 2 s2/3t -2 + y. If U2 instead invests KNI, then its profit is 7ty2 = (K™ + s)(l - s/3t)
- I(KNI) = (s -1)(1 - J / 3 0 + (1 - ^ /3r)log + y. Comparison of these two profits shows
7
that t/2's optimal investment is KNI if and only if (1 + s/3i)(l + s) + (1 - j/3r) log >
7
21og(2/7). For s = 2 and / = 0.2, a tedious derivation shows that this last inequality is satisfied for
allr>0.
(Step 3) (KFI, KFI) is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium under the fully integrated
industry structure. If U2 invests K2 > K\ + 5, it supplies D\ at m\ - s and D2 at m2- It solves
f}2$2 = [K2 -Kx -s]qi(mhm2) + [p2-m2]q2(mhm2)- I(K2). (13')
When U\ invests KFty UTs best-response investment K2l satisfies
7t+7Cd( U2+7CD2) _ pi - F / -/r/ FI




is strictly concave in K2 for the Hotelling model. Hence, if the partial derivative
evaluated at K2 = KFI + s is negative, then it follows that K{ < KFI + s. We have
= 5/3-.y/9f-(2/3)es<0 (a-4)
dK2
for s = 2, r > 0.
Vertical integration by Ul andDl increases their joint profits. 7t^{ + n
^ i fandon ly i f ( l+^ / r ) s>3( l -5 /3 r ) log~ " " " - 1 1 + 3 7 . For .y = 2 and 7=0.2, a
^C/l + nD\ ^ ^ d only if s + f - I(KF") < t{\ + s/3t)2, which in turn holds if and only if (1 -
s/3t)(l - 5/3) > 7. For s = 2 and 7 = 0.2, this last inequality holds if and only if t > 5/3.
(Ste/? 5) Vertical integration by Ul andDl raises both output prices. In the Hotelling
model, both output prices rise if and only if KNI > (2/3)s, or 1 - s/3t > yelsl^. For s = 2 and 7=
0.2, this last inequality holds if and only if t > 2.77 (approximately).
PI PJ "r(Step 6) Hold-out problems among the upstream firms do not arise. njj\ + 7tj)\ >
l-_j/3f
Y
tedious derivation shows that this last inequality holds if and only if t < 16.76 (approximately).
Q.E.D.
Appendix B. No price discrimination
Under no price discrimination, the upstream firms simultaneously announce one price
each. We begin with non-integration. Assuming that C2 - s < c\ < C2 + s, UVs optimal price
satisfies the first-order condition
(b-1)
(If c\ < C2 - 5, then Ul also supplies D2. In the Hotelling example, we derive conditions under
which this type of deviation is not profitable.) Let q(mi,m2) be the equilibrium input price.
Add the following condition to Assumption 1:
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Assumption 1 (3) 0< dciim^nv^jdmj < <9c,(m1,m2)/^mI- < 1.
Assumption 1.3 states that the equilibrium input prices, which increase with input costs,
are more sensitive to its own costs than to competitor's costs. Furthermore, the input price
equilibrium is "stable": a dollar increase in the input cost raises the input price by less than a
dollar. Assumption 1.3 (which applies to the input market) parallels Assumption 1.1 (which
applies to the output market).
UVs investment problem is:
Max a(j[ = [c1(m1,m2)-m1]^1(c1(m1,m2),C2(m1,m2)) - I(Kt). . (b-2)
Ki
The symmetric interior equilibrium investment under non-integration, denoted by K , is




',cN!) • [cN'-mN'M^ .
 nkNI) = 0, (b-3)
where m = m - K is the equilibrium input cost and c is the equilibrium input price
(defined by (b-1)). (Notice that the investments under non-integration are typically strategic
substitutes in the case of no price discrimination. In contrast, investments under non-integration
are typically strategic complements in the case of price discrimination.)
Now suppose that U\ and D1 integrate. As in the case of price discrimination, the
combined firm transfers its input to the downstream division at cost and is willing to supply the
non-integrated downstream firm D2 at cost. Hence, Z)2's equilibrium input price is m\ + s, as in
the case of price discrimination. Thus, Ul-DYs and C/2's investment problems are exactly the
same as in the case of price discrimination. The following result shows that, if the upstream
profit margin under non-integration is equal to the supplier switching cost, vertical integration
~ PI
reduces upstream investments. Denote the integrated firm's optimal investment by K\ and the
~ PI " PI PI " PI PI
unintegrated upstream firm's optimal investment by K^ . Then, K{ = K{ and K£ = K%
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Proposition B-l Under Assumptions 1 - 4, K?1 < KNI and k{1 < KNI for s = cNI - m^7.
Proof. For 5 = c M - mNI, a comparison of (3) and (b-3) shows that KNI > KNI. (This result
follows from Assumption 1.3.) There is no other difference from Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Propositions 3 and 4 (which concern the effects of counter-integration) apply to the case
of no price discrimination without any modification (even when s differs from c - m ). To
see why, simply notice that the investment problems under full integration are exactly the same
under both price discrimination and no discrimination. Propositions 2,5 and 6 apply to the case
of no price discrimination for s = c - m . (This can be proved by using Proposition B-l.)
Hence, we conclude that for s = cNI - fhNI, the analysis in the main text apply to the case of no
price discrimination.
We now turn to the Hotelling model in order to show the robustness of our results even
when s* cNI - mNI. In the Hotelling model, (b-l) yields the equilibrium input prices under
non-integration: cI(mi,m2) = 3f + [2mi + miJ/3 so that c - mNI = 3t. (Recall that c,-(mi,m2)
is derived under the assumption that Q - S <C\< Q + S. For c to be a Nash equilibrium, we
need s > (3/2) t. Otherwise, an upstream firm can earn higher profits by cutting its price slightly
below cNI - s.) The Hotelling model actually requires that s< 3t. (Otherwise, the non-
integrated downstream firm D2%s equilibrium output under partial integration is equal to 0. Then,
vertical integration by Ul and Dl necessarily triggers a counter-merger by U2 and D2.) The
following proposition establishes conditions under which an anticompetitive vertical integration
arises in equilibrium.
Proposition B-7 Consider the Hotelling model with /(£) = yK2/!, y>0,foTK< 2/[3 y\ and I(K)
= 00, for K> 2/[3y]. Suppose that 3[V3 -1] < a < 3 and that 2/9 < P < min { ,
^y2 S -y _ 1 ' I 9
, }, where a=s/t and B= ty. Then, a profitable but anticompetitive (both for
2a[2a-3] 9 - a
consumers and for aggregate efficiency) vertical integration without price discrimination arises
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in equilibrium without triggering the counter-integration by the remaining firms or causing hold-
out problems among the upstream firms.
Proof. From (b-3), KNI = 2/[3y]. Substituting Km into (b-2) yields £$f = &$> = 3* - 2/[9y].
Output prices arepi = Pi = m + 4 r - 2/[3y]. A downstream firm's profit under non-
integration does not change from the case of price discrimination: njyi = ftjyi = t. Under partial
integration, we obtain the same equilibrium outcome as in the case of price discrimination: K\
= 0 , k l l = [ 1 - a/3]/% pf1 = m + t + s/3, p ? = m + t + ( 2 / 3 ) * , nfj[ + jt^[ = t[l + a/3]2,
= s[l - a/3] + [1 - a/3]2/[2yJ, and ftpi = r[l + a/3]2. Hence, vertical integration is
2 2
profitable if and only if P < . Both output prices rises if and only if 0 <a][3-a] 9-a
2
Hold-out problems do not arise if and only if j3 > , which is implied by p > 2/9.32
6a[l + a]
Under full integration, again, we obtain the same equilibrium outcome as in the case of price
discrimination: KFI = 2/[3y] and 7tf}[ + n™\ = n^ + ^m = t - 2/[9y]. Thus, counter-
integration is not profitable if and only if p < . (The second-order conditions
require that p > 2/9.) A straightforward derivation shows that there exists a non-empty interval
of values of P which satisfies all the conditions for 3[V3 -1] < a < 3. Q.E.D.
Notice that the investment cost function in Proposition B-7 has a kink at K= 2/[3y]. As
in Proposition 7, without the kink, U2 may find it profitable to increase its investment from [1 -
a/3]fy to 2/yand supply both downstream firms by cut its price to slightly below m - s. Again,
this cannot happen if vertical integration is a commitment to internal supply by the integrating
firms. As in Proposition 7, one can avoid this sudden increase in the investment cost function by
examining an exponential cost function.
32
 Recall that the above derivation assumes that U2 sells only to D2 (at m + s). U2 can sell to
both D1 and D2 by cutting its price to m - s. In that case, f/2's optimal investment is 2/[3y], the
maximum feasible investment. (Without the kink in the investment cost function, U2 would
invest 2/y.) It is not difficult to show that this deviation is not profitable for U2 if and only if p >
[11 + 6 a- a2]/[6a(9 - a)], which is implied by P > 2/9 and 3[V3 -1] < a < 3.
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Appendix C. Cournot downstream competition
For simplicity, we assume that the final outputs are perfect substitutes. Let Q = q\ + q2
be the industry output and let P(Q) be the inverse demand function, with P'{Q) < 0 when P(Q) >
0. The first-order condition for Di is P(Q) + P'{Q)qi - c; = 0. We make repeated use of this first-
order condition in the proofs. Assumptions 1 - 4 are modified as follows:
Assumption C-l 0 < ^ f ^ < -
dcj [$
















~ P'(Q){{dql{m,m)ldc2) + (dq2(m,m)/dc2)}]
Assumptions C-l and C-2 are almost the same as Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively.
These two assumptions are satisfied by the linear demand functions [P(Q) = a - Q], Assumption
C-3 combines Assumptions 3 and 4. It requires that the "adjusted" downstream profit margin is
higher than the switching cost (i.e., upstream profit margin under non-integration). For the linear
demand function, <#(q, cj) = [P(Q, cj) - q] = [a - 2c/ + c/]/3. Hence, Assumption C-3 is satisfied
if and only if [P(m, m)- m]>3s: the downstream profit margin under full integration is greater
than three times the switching cost.
Under non-integration, equation (3) still characterizes equilibrium investments KNI.
Under partial integration, the first-order condition of the integrated firm Ul-Dl is given by
)<0, (c-7)
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and the unintegrated upstream firm UTs optimal investment K2 is still characterized by




with equality holding for KFl > 0. A comparison of equation (3), (c-7) and (10) yields a result
that parallels Proposition 1:
Proposition C-l Under Assumptions Cl - C3, K[! < KNI and K%1 < KNI.
Proof.
=




The first equality follows from equations (3) and (c-7). The first inequality follows from the
first-order Taylor expansion to q\ and the first two parts of Assumption 2.1 (all terms in the third
and fourth lines are evaluated at + s)). The second inequality follows from
Assumption C-3.1. The proof for K% ^ K is exactly the same as in Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
From (c-7) and (c-14), we obtain a result analogous to Proposition 3:
Proposition C-3 Under Assumptions Cl - C3, K[! < KF1.







* 1 J (mFI,mFI)
50
[ [dci dc2)) d
The first equality follows from equations (c-7) and (c-14). The first inequality follows from the
first-order Taylor expansion to q\ and the last part of Assumption 2.1 (all terms are now
evaluated at (m ,m )). The second inequality follows from Assumption C-3.2. Q.E.D.
In the homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs of production,
vertical integration raises the output price if and only if the sum of marginal costs increases. As
in Section 4, this occurs when the vertically integrated firm reduces its investments sufficiently:
Assumption C-5 If Km - K?1 > s/2.
The effects of vertical integration on final consumers and overall social surplus are
similar to those in Section 4:
Proposition C-6 Under Assumptions C-l - C-3 and C-5, vertical integration by U\ and D1
reduces both consumer surplus and overall social surplus.
Proof. 2cNI =2[m - KNI +s)> c[! + eg1 =2[m - K(!] + sif and only if KNI - Kf1 > s/2.
The negative effect on social surplus can be proved along the lines in Proposition 6. Q.E.D.
The above results show that the effects of vertical merger on investments, output prices
and social surplus under Cournot downstream competition are analogous to those under Bertrand
downstream competition. The profitability of vertical integration (and counter-integration),
however, can be quite different under different modes of downstream competition. Unlike under
Bertrand downstream competition, the initial vertical merger under Cournot downstream
competition is always profitable in our model. (Both the elimination of the double markup and
the adjustment of investments by the integrating firms raise their joint profits.) Since the
counter-merger with fixed investments is also always profitable under Cournot downstream
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competition, the already-integrated upstream firm must raise its cost-reducing investments
substantially to make counter-merger unprofitable. In Proposition 8, we stated the conditions
under which counter-merger is unprofitable for linear demand functions and quadratic
investment cost functions. The proof of this claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 8. From equations (3), (c-7), (10), and (c-14), we obtain KNI = [a- 2s]l[2>y
-1], Kf1 =2[a+s)/[9y-2), K%* = [39a-2(3y- l)j]/M9y-2],and KFl = 4<z/[9y-4].
(Second-order conditions are satisfied if y> 8/9.) The equilibrium outputs are qNl = [a- s +
tfM]/3 = [3)tx-(3y+l)s]/3[3y-l], qf1 =[<x+s + £1/>/]/3 = 3y[a + 1s]/[9y-2], qg1 =[a-2s +
K{!]/3 = [3ya + (6y- 2)s]/[9y- 2], and qFI = [a+ KFI]/3 = 3ya /[9y- 4]. The equilibrium
profits are *#{ = *% = s^ - \ [KNI}\ *% = ^  = [^f. *R +
Output price rises (that is, Assumption C-5 is satisfied) if and only if A >
- 1 0 _
, where A s [a - m ]/s. (It is not difficult to show that Assumptions C-5 imply
6y
PI PIAssumptions C-l - C-3 in this example.) Counter-merger is not profitable (that is, nfji + n
KU2 + ^1)2 if ^ d only if
2y [9y -8 ] [9y -2 ] A ^
 p ^ _ ^ _ 2 ) j [ y ( 6 y _ 1 ) A + 2 ( 3 y 2 _ 5 y +1) ; ,
[ 9 y - 4 ] z
and hold-out problems do not arise (that is, n{j[ + K^}\ > nfyi + n^i) if and only if
2y2[9y - 2]A2 > [3yA - (6y - 2)][y(6y - 1)A + 2(3y2 -5y +1)].
For K^1 to be a Nash equilibrium under non-integration, a deviation by U\ to K\ >
• i^  u- u *- u w [ A + (6y + 2 ) A ( 6 y + 4 2 / 3 y ) ] _ .
s must not yield a higher profit than nfA = -^^  M Ljli. It is not
6[3y- l ] 2
difficult to show that, UVs optimal deviation is to KNI = ——, with the resulting profit 7t{j{
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—-—. A straightforward derivation shows that n^{ > nfji if and only if A < — .
(Rising output price and njj[ > njj[ guarantees that n^x > 0.)
Similarly, we need to confirm that deviations to very high or very low investment levels
are not profitable under partial integration and full integration. Tedious derivations show that
none of these deviations are profitable for — < A < — 2. and y > 20/3.
6 / 3y
(y> 20/3 guarantees that this interval is not empty.)
Finally, it is not difficult to show that rising prices ensures that counter-merger is not
profitable (for y> 20/3). Similarly, KJJ\ > njj[ guarantees that no hold-out problems arise.
Q.E.D.
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